Numerical Asymptotic Results in Game Theory Using Sergeyev's Infinity
  Computing by Fiaschi, Lorenzo & Cococcioni, Marco
ar
X
iv
:1
80
8.
00
73
8v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
 A
ug
 20
18
Numerical Asymptotic Results
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Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is a widely studied game that
plays an important role in Game Theory. This paper aims
at extending PD Tournaments to the case of infinite, finite
or infinitesimal payoffs using Sergeyev’s Infinity Comput-
ing (IC). By exploiting IC, we are able to show the limits
of the classical approach to PD Tournaments analysis of
the classical theory, extending both the sets of the feasible
and numerically computable tournaments. In particular we
provide a numerical computation of the exact outcome of a
simple PD Tournament where one player meets every other
an infinite number of times, for both its deterministic and
stochastic formulations.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Nowadays Game Theory (GT) is widely used in very different areas,
such as biology, engineering, social sciences, and so on. An important
⋆ email: lorenzo.fiaschi@gmail.com
† email: marco.cococcioni@unipi.it
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role in matrix GT is played by the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
and its variants. This kind of games continue to attract the interest of
researchers, especially under challenging settings like infinitely repeated
games [5], games with an infinite amount of players [25] or games with
infinitesimal probabilities [4].
Despite these remarkable attempts to extend the GT to the case of
infinite or infinitesimal quantities, most of the times conditions are im-
posed to reduce the original problem to one involving finite quantities.
This approach is typical to limit the value of the payoffs to make them
finite (and thus comparable) quantities [20, 21, 24], allowing one to
resort to the familiar machinery of classical GT with finite quantities.
Real applications, on the contrary, sometimes involve payoffs which
are incomparably larger than others (e.g., losing own life vs losing one
dollar).
Though in the past we had no numerical tools suitable to deal with
infinite, finite and infinitesimal quantities, this is no longer the case
since the introduction of Sergeyev’s Infinity Computing (IC), happened
in 2003 [27].
Thanks to this novel approach, many open problems have been tack-
led using it by performing numerical computations with infinite and
infinitesimal quantities in a handy way (for detailed introductory sur-
veys see [35, 28, 29, 32, 33], while [27] contains an introduction to the
topic written in a popular way). This computational methodology has
already been successfully applied in optimization and numerical differ-
entiation [8, 9, 11, 30, 38, 43] and in a number of other theoretical and
computational research areas such as cellular automata [10], Euclidean
and hyperbolic geometry [16], fractals [6, 7, 31, 34, 42], Bertrand’s Para-
dox and mathematical determination [22], Turing machines [37, 36], and
numerical solution of ordinary differential equations [1, 39].
This methodology uses a numeral system working with an infinite
number called Grossone, expressed by the numeral ①, and defined as
the number of elements of the set of natural numbers (the consistency,
and more precisely the relative consistency of the methodology, has
been studied in [15]). This numeral system allows to denote a variety
of numbers involving different infinite and infinitesimal parts and to ex-
ecute operations with all of them in a single framework. Such numeral
system and the associated operations can be implemented in hardware
for a new generation of computers, called by Sergeyev himself Infinity
Computers.
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We have exploited Sergeyev’s IC for studying PD Tournaments. In
particular we have been able to overcome the issues that occur using
the classical limit theory for studying a player that meets the others an
infinite number of times.
In Section 2 we briefly describe the classical formulations of PD
Tournaments. Then in Section 3 we introduce the IC and the associ-
ated Grossone Methodology (GM). In Section 4 and 5 we extend PD
Tournaments in both deterministic and stochastic settings, using the
GM. Section 6 presents the numerical results of the GM applied to
stochastic PD Tournaments, while Section 7 is devoted to conclusions.
2 CLASSICAL FORMULATION OF PD TOURNAMENTS
In the generalized form of the PD two players have to independently
decide whether to cooperate (C) or to defect (D). The first player will
get one of the following payoffs T1, R1, P1, or S1, depending on his and
other player’s choice. Similarly, the second player will get T2, R2, P2,
or S2. In this paper we will assume the games are symmetric, i.e.,
T1 = T2 = T , R1 = R2 = R, etc. In addition a game is called a PD
game if the payoffs follow the relation T > R > P > S (fundamental
law) and the payoff obtained by a player is T , R, P or S when the
outcome is DC,CC,DD, or CD, respectively. The latter condition
reads as follows: a player gets the reward T when he has chosen to
defect and the other has chosen to cooperate, while he gets R when
they have both cooperated, and so on. Further information can be
found in [40].
2.1 PD Tournament
The basic PD game described above can also be repeated many times
among multiple players. In the literature, when a PD game is repeated
multiple times, it is denoted as iterated PD. A PD Tournament is a
particular type of iterated PD, characterized by a set of players, where
each one has his own strategy S. Every player meets each other a large
number of times and at each interaction the basic (one-shot) PD game
is played, then the reward of a player is summed up to his own previous
ones. The player with the greatest total reward is the tournament win-
ner, and the associated strategy is the winning strategy. The strategy
of each player can be defined as the probability of cooperation at each
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step of the repeated game, taking into account what the other players
have done in the previous games (if they have cooperated or not).
Many different types of tournament exist. In this paper we focus on
tournaments with memory-one strategies in a non evolutionary context,
i.e., tournaments where: i) the strategies at a given stage are influenced
by the outcome of the previous stage only, and ii) there are no concepts
of population (i.e. each strategy is represented at most once).
In this setting the strategy S adopted by each player can be described
by a tuple of five numbers, (y, p1, p2, p3, p4), where y is the probability
to cooperate at the first round and the four values p1, ..., p4 are the
probabilities to cooperate if the outcome of the previous round was,
respectively, CC,CD,DC, or DD (p1 represents the probability for
cooperating during next interaction, provided that both of the players
have cooperated in the previous interaction, p2 is the probability of
cooperating if the player has cooperated while the other did not, and
so on).
Notice that the memory-one assumption in many cases does not
constitute a limitation, due to the results provided in [13, 19, 40].
In Section 4 and 5 we will generalize these PD tournaments to the
case of infinite or infinitesimal payoffs and after infinite interactions.
Before doing that, let us introduce the mathematical tools for describ-
ing infinite and infinitesimal numbers.
3 INFINITY COMPUTING AND GROSSONE
METHODOLOGY
As said before, in [27, 28, 29, 33, 32] a computational methodology able
to deal with infinite, finite and infinitesimal numbers in the same single
framework has been realized by means of a new numeral system with
infinite base. The latter is called Grossone, indicated by the numeral
① and defined as the number of elements in the set of natural numbers
N.
The new numeral ① has been introduced by describing its properties
(following the same approach that led to the introduction of the zero
in the past to switch from natural to integer numbers). To introduce
Grossone, a methodological platform has been populated with three
methodological postulates and The Infinite Unit Axiom is added to the
axioms of real numbers [35, 27, 29, 32, 33]. In particular, the axiom
states that for any given finite integer n the number ①
n
is natural and
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infinitely large, since ①
n
< ①. More precisely, ①
n
denotes the num-
ber of elements of any arithmetical progression of the form k, k + n,
k + 2n, . . ., with 1 ≤ k ≤ n and k, n finite [22]. Since the axiom is
added to the standard axioms of real numbers, all standard properties
(commutative, associative, existence of inverse, etc.) also apply to ①
and Grossone-based numbers. Instead of the usual symbol∞, different
infinite and/or infinitesimal numbers can be used thanks to ①. Inde-
terminate forms as encountered in the classical analysis (e.g., ∞−∞,
∞
∞ ) are no more present and, for example, the following relations hold
for any finite, infinite and infinitesimals number expressible in the new
numeral system:
0 ·① = ① · 0 = 0, ①−1 > ①−2 > 0, 2①−① = ①
①
0 = ①1−1 = ①1 ·①−1 =
①
①
= 1, ①−1 = ① ·①−2 =
①
①
2
.
In particular, Grossone works as a base in a numeral system whose
generic element c˜ (called gross-scalar) can be represented with a nota-
tion in the middle between the polynomial and the common positional
numeral systems one:
c˜ = cpm①
pm + ...+ cp1①
p1 + cp0①
p0 + cp−1①
p−1 + ...+ cp−k①
p−k ,
where m, k ∈ N, exponents pi are called gross-powers (they can be
numbers of the type of c˜) with p0 = 0, and i = m, ..., 1, 0,−1, ...,−k.
Then, cp
i
6= 0 called gross-digits are finite (positive or negative) num-
bers, i = m, ..., 1, 0,−1, ...,−k. In this numeral system, finite numbers
are represented by numerals with the highest gross-power equal to zero,
e.g., −6.2 = −6.2①0. Infinitesimals are represented by numerals having
only negative (finite or infinite) gross-powers. The simplest infinitesi-
mal is ①−1 for which ①−1 ·① = 1. Moreover it is worth noting that all
infinitesimals are not equal to zero, e.g., ①−1 > 0. Finally, a number
is infinite if it has at least one positive finite or infinite gross-power.
For instance, the number 43.6①4.56① + 16.7①3.6 − 3.2①−2.1 is infinite,
it consists of two infinite parts and one infinitesimal part.
The new methodology provides a computational framework that
handles infinite and infinitesimal numbers and a floating-point arith-
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metic can be carried out with gross-numbers that have determinate
infinite and infinitesimal values.
These latter properties set Sergeyev’s methodology apart from non-
standard analysis [23], where non-standard infinite and infinitesimal
numbers are introduced but there is no way of assigning them specific
and concrete values, no way to manage them numerically by a calcula-
tor, no way to instantiate ordering relationships among them. Indeed
non-standard analysis is a purely symbolic technique that works with
ultrafilters, external and internal sets, standard and non-standard num-
bers.
On the other hand, the IC-based approach does not use any of these
notions, focuses on numerical computations and separates mathemat-
ical objects from tools used to study them, being sensitive to the fact
that the instruments employed both determine the kind of possible in-
terventions on the object of study and constrain the accuracy of the
numerical results that can be obtained.
The foregoing remarks, as well as other reasons (e.g., the possibil-
ity to establish the maximal discriminable number in a sequence) show
how the Grossone-based methodology differs from other kinds of in-
finitesimal methods. Further differences are discussed in [26].
4 DETERMINISTIC PD TOURNAMENT USING
GROSSONE METHODOLOGY
In Deterministic PD Tournaments (DPDTs) [2, 14] with m players,
every strategy Sk(yk, p1k, p2k, p3k, p4k) has parameters that are either
equal to 0 or equal to 1:
yk, p1k, p2k, p3k, p4k ∈ {0, 1} ∀k = 1, ...,m .
Let us to consider a classical DPDT with three players ℘1, ℘2 and ℘3,
identified by their own strategies: Du, TRIGGER and TFT defined
as follows:
Du = S(0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
TRIGGER = S(1, 1, 0, 0, 0)
TFT = S(1, 1, 0, 1, 0).
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The three strategies work as follows.
• The Du strategy consists in a constant defection.
• The TRIGGER strategy (also known as GRIM TRIGGER or
simply GRIM [12, 40, 41]) starts cooperating, then the cooper-
ative behavior stands as long as both players cooperate. At the
first opponent’s uncooperative choice it will never cooperate any-
more.
• Finally the TFT strategy (tit-for-tat, the strategy proposed by
the professor Anatol Rapoport for the Axelrod’s PD Tournaments
[2, 3]) starts cooperating and then emulates the opponent’s pre-
vious behavior.
Starting the tournament, after each strategy has been played against
each other n times, we obtain the results given in Table 1. There, E n℘i,℘j
is the short form of E℘i,℘j (n) and reads as the Expectation of ℘i when
plays against ℘j n times; E
n
℘i
stands for E℘i(n) and reads as the total
expectation of the player ℘i after having played against each other
player n times. A complete explanation of these result is provided in
the Appendix A.
℘1 ℘2 ℘3
E n℘1,℘2 = T +(n− 1)P E
n
℘2,℘1
= S + (n− 1)P E n℘3,℘1 = S + (n− 1)P
E n℘1,℘3 = T +(n− 1)P E
n
℘2,℘3
= nR E n℘3,℘2 = nR
E n℘1 = 2T + 2(n− 1)P E
n
℘2
= nR+(n−1)P +S E n℘3 = nR+(n−1)P +S
Table 1
Expectations (E) of ℘1, ℘2 and ℘3 after n interactions with each other player
(the last row is the sum of the two terms on the previous one)
For next discussions, it suffices to focus on players ℘1 and ℘2 and on
their performance-wise relation, described by the sign of the function:
∆(℘1, ℘2, n) = E℘1(n)− E℘2(n) = 2T + (n− 1)P − nR− S.
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Let us study the relation “℘1 does better than ℘2 when n → ∞”,
having already fixed some finite values for T , P and S. In what fol-
lows we will compare the result provided by an application of classical
analysis those obtained by means of GM.
First of all we state the problem more formally:
∆(℘1, ℘2, n) > 0 iff 2T + (n− 1)P − nR− S > 0
from which we deduce:
∆(℘1, ℘2, n) > 0 iff R <
2T + (n− 1)P − S
n
(1)
If we now study the asymptotic behaviour of this tournament when
n→ +∞, using the classical limit theory, we obtain:
lim
n→∞
∆(℘1, ℘2, n) > 0 iff R < lim
n→∞
2T + (n− 1)P − S
n
from which we obtain:
lim
n→∞
∆(℘1, ℘2, n) > 0 iff R < P. (2)
Unfortunately, the latter result (R < P ) breaks the fundamental law
of PD Tournaments: T > R > P > S.
Thus, using the classical analysis, we are inclined to conclude that
there is no way to build a PD Tournament where T > R > P > S
and where “℘1 does better than ℘2” with certainty, when n→∞ (i.e.,
asymptotically).
By contrast, using Sergeyev’s IC, we are able to build a PD Tour-
nament that does not break the fundamental law.
Indeed, by simply putting n = ① in (1), we obtain:
R <
2T + (①− 1)P − S
①
(3)
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which is interesting because
2T+(①−1)P−S
①
is greater than P , as
shown below:
2T + (①− 1)P − S
①
= P + (2T − P − S)①−1 > P (4)
The inequality in (4) holds because the fundamental law assures that
(2T − P − S) > 0 (and thus (2T − P − S)①−1 is a positive quantity,
although infinitesimal).
This means that if we choose R within the open interval
R ∈
(
P , P + (2T − P − S)①−1
)
(5)
we are guaranteed that “℘1 does better than ℘2”, asymptotically,
i.e., after ① iterations.
Such an open interval is interesting because its width is infinitesimal,
meaning that R > P but R is infinitely close to P .
This highlights that the problem is mainly with the value that we
can assign to T,R, P and S, more than with the use of classical limit
theory itself.
Sergeyev’s IC allows us to deal with PD Tournaments where payoffs
can be infinite, finite, or infinitesimal, or infinitely close to each other.
A similar result could be obtained using Non-Standard Analysis
(NSA) as well but, since NSA is a symbolic tool, it cannot be used
to perform numerical computations in environments like Matlab, R,
Julia, etc, not being able to assign to the non-standard infinities and
infinitesimals a concrete number. The possibility to build PD Tour-
naments and to compute the expectations numerically in Matlab is
important when computations become more complex, as in Stochastic
PD Tournaments introduced in section 5.
To start appreciating the numerical added-value of IC in this context,
let us pick a numerical value for R within the allowed interval provided
in Equation (5). For instance, we can choose R as its midpoint:
R = P +
(2T − P − S)①−1
2
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Doing so, we satisfy the following requirements simultaneously:
• R > P (fundamental law), and
• R < P + (2T − P − S)①−1 (tournament existence condition).
Even more importantly, we are able to compute the exact expecta-
tions in a numerical way (℘1 always beats ℘2, since E℘1(n) > E℘2(n)
∀ n ∈ N):
E℘1(①) = 2P①+ 2(T − P ), E℘2(①) = ①(R + P )− P + S,
and E℘1 (①) > E℘2(①) since 2T > P + S (due again to the funda-
mental law).
Thus we have built a tournament where R is a function of T , P and
S. If we now assign values to T , P and S, we can build and solve a
specific tournament as in the following instance:


T = 10
R = 4 + 8.5①−1
P = 4
S = −1
The players final ranking is therefore:
1st ℘1 E℘1(①) = 8①+ 12
2nd ℘2, ℘3 E℘2(①) = E℘3(①) = 8①+ 3.5 (ex-aequo)
As a final remark before concluding this section, let us observe how
the PD Tournament built above assures that “℘1 does better than
℘2” not only asymptotically, but also when the number of interactions
assumes a finite value, i.e., always. This means that we have been able
to build a PD Tournament where “℘1 does better than ℘2”, irrespective
of the number of interactions.
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5 STOCHASTIC PD TOURNAMENTS USING
GROSSONE METHODOLOGY
Stochastic PD Tournaments (SPDTs) [17, 18] are a generalization of
the previously introduced DPDTs. In particular they are tournaments
where one or more players use a non-deterministic strategy, i.e., strate-
gies having at least one of their properties (yk, p1k, p2k, p3k, p4k) that
belongs to the open interval (0, 1) instead of being either 0 or 1:
∃k | Sk has at least one of its parameters in (0, 1).
As pointed out in Section 2, we assume that each player plays accord-
ing to the memory-one approach. Then the evolution of the interactions
among the strategies adopted by each player can be seen as a Markov
process and, as such, can be completely described by providing the as-
sociate probabilistic transition matrix and the initial state distribution
across the state space [17, 18].
The matrix of probabilities associated to each possible state (i.e.,
each possible outcome of an interaction between two players) at the n-
th meeting can be therefore computed by multiplying the distribution
vector of the game initial state by the transition matrix elevated to n-1.
Recalling the formalism of Section 4, we can model an SPDT using
the following entities:
P = {℘1, ..., ℘m} (the set of players)
Sk = S(yk, p1k, p2k, p3k, p4k) ∀k = 1, ...,m
(
the strategy
of each player
)
p¯hk = 1− phk ∀h = 1, ..., 4 ∀k = 1, ...,m
(
the complementary
probabilities
)
Akj =
[
ykyj yky¯j y¯kyj y¯ky¯j
] (initial distribution
across the states
)
Lkj =


p1kp1j p1kp¯1j p¯1kp1j p¯1kp¯1j
p2kp3j p2kp¯3j p¯2kp3j p¯2kp¯3j
p3kp2j p3kp¯2j p¯3kp2j p¯3kp¯2j
p4kp4j p4kp¯4j p¯4kp4j p¯4kp¯4j


(
transition matrix
between ℘k and ℘j
)
Q =
[
R S T P
]
(vector of payoffs)
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E℘k(n) =
n∑
t=1
m∑
i=1,
i6=k
AkiL
t−1
ki Q
T
(
expectation of player ℘k after n
interactions with each other player
)
We are now ready to compute the relation ∆, describing the difference
between the performances of two generic players ℘k and ℘j after n
interactions:
∆(℘k, ℘j , n) =
n∑
t=1
( m∑
i=1,
i6=k
AkiL
t−1
ki −
m∑
i=1,
i6=j
AjiL
t−1
ji
)
QT =
=
n∑
t=1
[
AkjL
t−1
kj −AjkL
t−1
jk +
m∑
i=1,
i6=j,k
(AkiL
t−1
ki −AjiL
t−1
ji )
]
QT (6)
In order to explain what follows, it is worth recalling that every
time the matrix Lkj described above is i) irreducible, ii) positive re-
current and iii) aperiodic, then by means of the ergodic theorem it is
asymptotically stationary too, i.e.,
∃ n˜ ∈ N | Ln˜kj
∼= Ln˜+tkj ∀k, j = 1, ...,m , ∀t ∈ N (7)
Then, by means of Equation (7), we can approximate Equation (6)
as the sum of two elements, namely its transitional behavior Fkj (i.e.
the sum of the values assumed by the function while t < n˜) and its
asymptotic behavior Gkj (i.e. the sum of its value of convergence every
time t ≥ n˜). The approximated version of ∆ therefore is:
∆˜(℘k, ℘j , n) ,
[
Fkj +
n∑
t=n˜
Gkj
]
QT = [ Fkj + (n− n˜)Gkj ]Q
T , (8)
having defined Fkj , Gkj as the next 4-dimensional row vectors:
12
Fkj =
n˜−1∑
t=1
[
AkjL
t−1
kj −AjkL
t−1
jk +
m∑
i=1,
i6=j,k
(
AkiL
t−1
ki −AjiL
t−1
ji
)]
and
Gkj =
[
AkjL
n˜
kj −AjkL
n˜
jk +
m∑
i=1,
i6=j,k
(
AkiL
n˜
ki −AjiL
n˜
ji
)]
.
The approximated version of ∆ can also be expressed in the following
alternative way:
∆˜(℘k, ℘j, n) = αkj + nβkj , (9)
having defined αkj =
[
Fkj − n˜Gkj
]
QT and βkj = GkjQ
T , αkj , βkj ∈
R. We have introduced this additional formulation, because it shows
more clearly that the dependency with n is a straight line where βkj is
the slope and αkj the intercept. Of course, we have multiple straight
lines, one for each pair of distinct players. It is worth noting that
such lines exist if and only if n > n˜ and that αkj and βkj are linear
combinations of the payoffs. In the remaining part of the paper we will
focus on the case β 6= 0, which means that at each interaction one of
the two players does better than the other (the case β = 0 being much
less interesting).
5.1 An Example of Application
In this subsection we provide an example of a possible real world ap-
plication of the SPDT treated with the GM.
Imagine a scenario where m brands or companies have to interact
repeatedly in a competitive way. Moreover, let us make some additional
assumptions: i) each interaction can be described as a PD where the
payoffs are environmental parameters (like exchange fees), set in some
way; ii) the payoffs stay fixed for a given period of time (for example
the calendar year); iii) at the end of this period we are interested in
the total utility of the entities (earnings of the companies). From these
three assumptions it is clear that we can model the given scenario as a
PD Tournament.
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Suppose now that the payoffs can be set only by a third party, not in-
volved in the interactions. We will refer to it as master (as an example,
the master could be the government or the regulator of the country in
which the interactions take place). Moreover we assume that the mas-
ter is somehow related to one of the involved entities and it wants to
set the payoffs ad-hoc, in order to guarantee it the highest performance
among all the other ones at the end of the period. Such specific com-
pany might be a state-owned company, to continue with the example.
At the same time the outperformance gap should not be too wide, in
order not to emphasize the ad-hoc parameters set by the master. Let’s
say that the gap between the second best performing entity must not
be grater than a threshold τ , again chosen by the master.
Thus the main task of the master is to identify, as a function of
the entities’ strategies (which for the sake of simplicity we suppose
known and memory-one), all the possible 4-tuples of values it can use
to initialize the payoffs in order to achieve its goal with certainty. Using
the model provided above and calling ℘∗ the state-owned company, the
problem can be formalized as follows.
Let us suppose that jˆ is the index of the best performing player in
P (P being the set of all the other companies, i.e., the ones not related
to the master):
jˆ = argmax
j∈{1...m}
(E℘j (n)).
The model M of the considered problem consists of the following
two inequalities:
M(τ, n) =
{
∆(℘∗, ℘jˆ , n) > 0
∆(℘∗, ℘jˆ , n) < τ
(10)
Once the number of interactions per period has been given a priori
(e.g., n = 100), a classical approach is still feasible (we are implicitly
assuming that every entity meets the others the same number of times).
By arbitrarily imposing n = 100 and τ = 20, we can solve the problem
described above, by finding the solutions to the model:
M(20, 100) =
{
∆(℘∗, ℘jˆ, 100) > 0
∆(℘∗, ℘jˆ, 100) < 20
(11)
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The result are two inequalities with three degrees of freedom, to
which we have to add the three inequalities of the fundamental law,
T > R > P > S. If the system admits a solution, then it is easy to
find it.
However, in real world scenarios, the number of player-player inter-
actions n is not always known in advance. Unless some other assump-
tions on the upper bound of the number of interactions are introduced,
the only feasible approach is performing a limit study when n goes to
infinity to analyze ∆’s behavior. Unfortunately this would not allow
us to solve the problem, basically because the gap (if there is) would
diverge to either ±∞. Thus, within classical GT there is no way to
give an answer that ensures that a specific company will be the best
one with a limiting out-performance threshold. On the other hand, by
using the GM we achieve a totally different scenario where we are able
to set up the tournament and to precisely analyze it when n is equal
to ①. However, when the solution exists, at least one of the payoff has
to be chosen from an infinitely small interval, as stated by the next
theorem.
Theorem 1 (At least one payoff has to be chosen from an in-
finitely small interval). Given an SPDT or a DPDT with m players
℘1, . . ., ℘m and an infinite number of interactions (studied by means
of GM)
And provided a finite upper bound, along with a finite lower bound
for the ∆˜ij function (a function defined over the players ℘i and ℘j and
over the players’ strategies S1, . . ., Sm)
And given that at least one relevant payoff is left free to vary (in
order to satisfy the constraints on ∆˜ij)
Then, when the set of admissible values for the free payoffs exists, it
will contain at least one payoff which has to be chosen from an infinitely
small (but still numerically computable) interval.
Proof. See Appendix B.
While Appendix B contains a theoretical proof which is valid in
general, in next section we also provide a constructive proof of the
same theorem, but for a specific numerical example.
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6 NUMERICAL RESULTS COMPARING CLASSICAL
ANALYSIS AND GROSSONE METHODOLOGY
We provide now the solution to (10) using both the classical analysis
and the GM. Before doing it, and for the sake of simplicity, let us
assume that the number of entities m is equal to 1, and thus only two
strategies are involved in the competition (S∗ and S1). It is worth
noting that in this case the payoffs R and P will not play any role in
the outcome of the tournament, since both the players will obtain R
and P on exactly the same occasions.
The numerical results shown in the following have been computed
in Matlab, after having implemented a simulator for the Infinity Com-
puter.
By using the following two strategies:
S∗ = S(0.8, 0.75, 0.2, 0.4, 0.05) S1 = S(0.4, 0.4, 0.1, 0.8, 0.1)
we obtain the initial distribution across the state space:
A∗1 =
[
0.32 0.48 0.08 0.4 0.12
]
A1∗ =
[
0.32 0.08 0.48 0.8 0.12
]
and the following two transition matrices:
L∗1 =


0.3 0.45 0.1 0.15
0.16 0.04 0.64 0.16
0.04 0.36 0.06 0.54
0.005 0.045 0.095 0.855

 L1∗ =


0.3 0.1 0.45 0.15
0.04 0.06 0.36 0.54
0.16 0.64 0.04 0.16
0.005 0.095 0.045 0.855


Their asymptotic counterparts are:
L
asym
∗1 =


0.038 0.106 0.148 0.708
0.038 0.106 0.148 0.708
0.038 0.106 0.148 0.708
0.038 0.106 0.148 0.708

 Lasym1∗ =


0.038 0.148 0.106 0.708
0.038 0.148 0.106 0.708
0.038 0.148 0.106 0.708
0.038 0.148 0.106 0.708


We will now study two cases: the case n = 100, τ = 20 and the case
n→∞, τ = 20. The second case will be analyzed using both the limit
theory (which as we shall see is not able to find any solution), and the
GM (which is able to provide a set of solutions, even if the interval
from which the parameter T has to be picked from is infinitely small).
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Case n = 100
When n = 100, the system of inequalities in Equation (10) becomes:
M(20, 100) =


2.6362 · 1029(T − S) > 0 (always true)
2.6362 · 1029(T − S) < 20
(
truewhen
T < S + 20
2.6362·1029
)
From which we derive the set of all possible 4-tuples solutions:


T ∈
(
S, S + 20
2.6362·1029
)
R ∈ (T, P )
P ∈ (R,S)
S chosen at will
〈 Solution to M(20, 100) 〉
Observe how the open interval
(
S, S + 20
2.6362·1029
)
, from which T
has to be picked from, has a finite length in this case.
Case n→∞ versus n = ① (or any other ①-based infinite number)
Now we show what we obtain when n→∞, exploiting respectively the
limit theory and the GM.
In classical terms, we can see that when n → ∞ the set of the
problem’s solutions becomes empty. Indeed, first of all observe that in
our toy example, we have
F∗1 =
[
0 −4.236 · 1088 +4.236 · 1088 0
]
and
G∗1 =
[
0 −0.042 +0.042 0
]
.
Then, applying the limit theory to Equation (8) when n˜ = 300 we get:
lim
n→∞
∆˜(℘∗, ℘jˆ , n) = (F∗1 + limn→∞
(n− n˜)G∗1) Q
T
Thus:
[
4.236 · 1088 + 0.042 lim
n→∞
(n− 300)
]
(T − S) = +∞.
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Note how using n˜ = 300 as asymptotic threshold leads to an an
approximation error (with respect to the stationary matrix) close to
10−15, an acceptable value.
Thus the model M˜ (which is the approximation of M when ∆˜ is
used in place of ∆ ) has no solutions, as the second equation is violated
by the fact that ∆˜ tends to the infinity:
M˜(20, n→∞) =


lim
n→∞
∆˜(℘∗, ℘jˆ , n) > 0 (always true)
lim
n→∞
∆˜(℘∗, ℘jˆ , n) < 20 (always false)
The fact that ∆˜(℘∗, ℘jˆ , n) tends to infinity is not accidental, since
its asymptotic behavior does not depend on the value of n˜, nor on the
values of T and S.
This is even more apparent when using for ∆˜ the expression given
on Equation (9):
∆˜(℘∗, ℘jˆ , n) = α∗jˆ + nβ∗jˆ
from which the fact that ∆˜ grows linearly with n is obvious, and thus
diverges (the only exception is when β∗jˆ = 0, a rare event).
In conclusion there is no way to set the four parameters (T , R, P
and S) in order to satisfy the second inequality in Equation (10).
On the other hand, using the Grossone approach, the divergence
is avoided by the fact that ① is a concrete number and, therefore,
numerical computations can be executed with it. Thus if the solutions
exist they can still be numerically computed:
∆(℘∗, ℘1,①) = (F∗1 + (①− n˜)G∗1) Q
T
= 4.2362 · 1088 + 0.0416(①− 300)](T − S).
Considering the given numerical example, the solving system
M˜(20,①) becomes:


∆˜(℘∗, ℘jˆ ,①) > 0 (always true)
∆˜(℘∗, ℘jˆ ,①) < 20

 truewhen
T < S + 20
4.2362·1088+0.0416(①−300)


The associated set of all possible 4-tuples solving it is:
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

T ∈
(
S, S + 20
4.2362·1088+0.0416(①−300)
)
R ∈ (T, P )
P ∈ (R,S)
S chosen at will
〈 Solution to M˜(20,①) 〉 (12)
The direct consequence of the previous considerations is that, ex-
ploiting the GM, we can always guarantee the possibility of creating
an environment (opportunely tuning the free parameters) where the
victory of one strategy is assured independently from the specific value
assigned to the number of interactions and to the maximum size of the
margin of victory. Continuing the analogy with the example, we are
able to find the whole set of 4-tuples (T , R, P , S) such that our goal
is assured to be reached independently from how large or small n and
τ , respectively, could be.
Observe how this result is not contradictory with classical limit the-
ory. Indeed, the open interval
(
S, S + 20
4.2362·1088+0.0416(①−300)
)
, from
which T has to be picked from, is infinitely small. Using the classical
limit theory we have not been able to derive (and even describe) the
set of solutions provided in Equation (12), because of the intrinsic lim-
itation of the mathematical language used therein.
Finally we wish to point out that the same numerical asymptotic
analysis based on IC could be performed even using different ①-based
numbers of interactions, such as n = ①
2
, n = ①
3
, etc., especially when
this choice is appropriate to model a peculiar feature of the SPDT at
hand. This is another kind of study that cannot be performed using
classical limit theory.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have shown how, by using GM, it is possible to nu-
merically build and solve new classes of PD Tournaments which were
even difficult to imagine and/or formulate, up to date. Moreover, not
only the GM allowed us to formulate such problems but also to solve
them numerically in Matlab, i.e., made this kind of problems compu-
tationally solvable even if they contain finite, infinite and infinitesimal
quantities at the same time.
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APPENDIX A EXPECTATIONS GIVEN ON TABLE 1
In this appendix we provide a complete step-by-step explanation of the
equations provided in Table 1. The explicit and simple form in which
the expectation of each player can be written is due to the fact that
we restrict ourselves to a deterministic tournament and therefore to a
deterministic evolution of the game’s history.
Let us start analyzing the player by player interactions and then to
sum up the results obtained in the total expectation of each strategy.
A.1 Interactions between ℘1 and ℘2
At the very first interaction between the two players, ℘1 defects and
℘2 cooperates. Therefore ℘1 earns T and ℘2 S. Moreover, because of
℘1 defection, ℘2 will defect at every other interaction with ℘1.
At the second interaction and for all the subsequent ones both ℘1
and ℘2 defect, ending both to gain P each time. More precisely, calling
n the total number of interactions between ℘1 and ℘2, this event (the
mutual defection) happens n-1 times, since the first interaction differs
from the others.
Summing up, the expectations of the two players after n interactions
are:
E℘1,℘2(n) = T + (n− 1)P E℘2,℘1(n) = S + (n− 1)P
A.2 Interactions between ℘1 and ℘3
At the very first interaction between the two players, ℘1 defects and ℘3
cooperates. Therefore ℘1 earns T and ℘3 S. Moreover, because of ℘1’s
defection and remembering that ℘2 subsequent choice is its enemy’s
previous one, ℘2 next action against ℘1 will be a defection.
At the second interaction both ℘1 and ℘3 defect, ending both to gain
P . It is worth noticing that this event (the mutual defection) will be
the outcome of every other interaction between ℘1 and ℘3, being ℘3’s
behavior dependent on ℘1’s one which is fixed. More precisely, calling
n the total number of interactions between ℘1 and ℘3, the mutual
defection happens n-1 times, since the first interaction differs from all
subsequent ones, which are identical.
Summing up what just said, the expectations of the two players after
their n interactions are:
E℘1,℘3(n) = T + (n− 1)P E℘3,℘1(n) = S + (n− 1)P
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A.3 Interactions between ℘2 and ℘3
At the very first interaction between the two players, both ℘2 and ℘3
cooperate. Therefore both earn R. Moreover, because ℘3 copies ℘2’s
previous behavior and ℘2 continues to cooperate as long as ℘3 does the
same, it is quite obvious that all the subsequent interactions between
such two players will result in a mutual cooperation (i.e., both players
gain R).
In conclusion, at every interaction between ℘2 and ℘3 the outcome
is a mutual cooperation. This leads an expectation for both players
equal to:
E℘2,℘3(n) = E℘3,℘2(n) = nR
where again n is the total number of interactions between the two
players.
A.4 Total expectations
In this sub-section we briefly show the resulting total expectation of
the three players after exactly n interactions with each other. These
results can be easily obtained by summing up the preceding expecta-
tions, player by player:
E℘1 (n) = E℘1,℘2(n) + E℘1,℘3(n) = 2 (T + (n− 1)P )
E℘2 (n) = E℘2,℘1(n) + E℘2,℘3(n) = nR+ (n− 1)P + S
E℘3 (n) = E℘3,℘1(n) + E℘3,℘2(n) = nR+ (n− 1)P + S
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 1
To prove Theorem 1, let us first define the following positive shift func-
tion Ψδ(x), which adds a positive value δ to x:
Ψδ(x) = x+ δ, δ > 0
The fundamental law system
F (T,R, P, S) =


T > R
R > P
P > S
can now be rewritten using Ψ as:
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F (T,R, P, S) =


T = Ψδ′
T
(R) = R+ δ′T , (δ
′
T > 0, free to vary)
R = Ψδ′
R
(P ) = P + δ′R, (δ
′
R > 0, free to vary)
P = Ψδ′
P
(S) = S + δ′P , (δ
′
P > 0, free to vary)
(13)
From (13) we get that three payoffs over four can be always described
as a function of the fourth, using the positive shift functions:
F (S, δP , δR, δT ) =


T = Ψδ′
T
(Ψδ′
R
(Ψδ′
P
(S))) = ΨδT (S) = S + δT
R = Ψδ′
R
(Ψδ′
P
(S)) = ΨδR(S) = S + δR
P = Ψδ′
P
(S) = ΨδP (S) = S + δP
(14)
where δT , δR and δP are defined as functions of δ
′
T , δ
′
R and δ
′
P defined
above:
δT = δ
′
T + δ
′
R + δP
δR = δ
′
R + δP
δP = δ
′
P
Combining (14) and (9) we get the following alternative expressions
for αkj and βkj , as functions of S, δP , δR, and δT :
αkj = λ
1
kjΨδR(S) + λ
2
kjS + λ
3
kjΨδT (S) + λ
4
kjΨδP (S)
βkj = µ
1
kjΨδR(S) + µ
2
kjS + µ
3
kjΨδT (S) + µ
4
kjΨδP (S)
where λikj and µ
i
kj are the i-th component of the vector (Fkj− n˜Gkj)
and Gkj , respectively.
Thus now (9) can be rewritten explicitly with respect to S as:
∆˜(℘k, ℘j , n) = (γ1n+ γ2)S + γ3n+ γ4 (15)
where
γ1 =
4∑
i=1
µikj , γ3 = µ
1
kjδR + µ
3
kjδT + µ
4
kjδP
γ2 =
4∑
i=1
λikj , γ4 = λ
1
kjδR + λ
3
kjδT + λ
4
kjδP
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Hereinafter we have to distinguish two cases: γ1 6= 0 and γ1 = 0.
Let us start from the first one.
B.1 Case γ1 6= 0
By means of (15) we can write the approximated version of (10) when
n = ① and τ is finite, in the following two alternative ways, according
to the sign of γ1:
M˜(①, τ) =
{
S > −γ3①+γ4
γ1①+γ2
S < τ−γ3①−γ4
γ1①+γ2
iff γ1 > 0 (16)
or
M˜(①, τ) =
{
S < −γ3①+γ4
γ1①+γ2
S > τ−γ3①−γ4
γ1①+γ2
iff γ1 < 0 (17)
Looking at (16) we can deduce that at least the payoff S must be
chosen in an infinitely small interval. Indeed
S ∈
(
−
γ3①+ γ4
γ1①+ γ2
,
τ − γ3①− γ4
γ1①+ γ2
)
,
an interval whose width W is equal to:
W =
τ − γ3①− γ4
γ1①+ γ2
+
γ3①+ γ4
γ1①+ γ2
=
τ
γ1①+ γ2
(18)
Such width is infinitesimal, since both γ1 and γ2 are finite. The same
considerations hold for (17), when using for S the interval:
S ∈
(
τ − γ3①− γ4
γ1①+ γ2
,−
γ3①+ γ4
γ1①+ γ2
)
.
B.2 Case γ1 = 0
The fact that γ1 = 0 has two consequences:
1. either S can be chosen in a finite interval (this happens every time
γ2 6= 0, see (18)) or it is free to vary, being problem-independent
(this happens when γ2 = 0). Thus in the following we can assume
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that S has been fixed, by choosing it at will or from within the
finite length interval;
2. at least one among µ1kj , µ
3
kj , µ
4
kj is non-zero.
The second assertion is true because if they were all equal to zero,
µ2kj would be zero too (since γ1 = 0). Then, by definition, βkj would
be zero, a case we decided not to analyze, being it uninteresting. Thus
we may rewrite (15) explicitly with respect to a δ associated to a non-
zero µkj , let it be δT . The idea is to prove that in this case it is the
payoff T which has to vary within an infinitely small interval. Indeed
the approximated ∆ function can be now rewritten as:
∆˜(℘k, ℘j , n) = δT (µ
3
kjn+ λ
3
kj) + γ2S + γ5n+ γ6 (19)
where
γ5 = γ3 − µ
3
kjδT = µ
1
kjδR + µ
4
kjδP
γ6 = γ4 − λ
3
kjδT = λ
1
kjδR + λ
4
kjδP
By means of (19) we can write the approximated version of (10)
when n = ① and τ is finite, as follows:
M˜(①, τ) =


δT > −
γ5①+γ6+γ2S
µ3
kj
①+λ3
kj
δT <
τ−γ5①−γ6−γ2S
µ3
kj
①+λ3
kj
iff µ3kj > 0 (20)
or
M˜(①, τ) =


δT < −
γ5①+γ6+γ2S
µ3
kj
①+λ3
kj
δT >
τ−γ5①−γ6−γ2S
µ3
kj
①+λ3
kj
iff µ3kj < 0 (21)
Looking at (20) we can deduce that δT , once fixed S, must be chosen
from within an infinitely small interval. Indeed
δT ∈
(
−
γ5①+ γ6 + γ2S
µ3kj①+ λ
3
kj
,
τ − γ5①− γ6 − γ2S
µ3kj①+ λ
3
kj
)
, (22)
i.e., an interval having width W equal to:
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W =
τ − γ5①− γ6 − γ2S
µ3kj①+ λ
3
kj
+
γ5①+ γ6 + γ2S
µ3kj①+ λ
3
kj
=
τ
µ3kj①+ λ
3
kj
(23)
Such width is infinitesimal, because both µ3kj and λ
3
kj are finite.
Moreover, combining the first equation of system (14) with (22) we get
the interval from within T has to vary:
T ∈
(
S −
γ5①+ γ6 + γ2S
µ3kj①+ λ
3
kj
, S +
τ − γ5①− γ6 − γ2S
µ3kj①+ λ
3
kj
)
that is again an infinitesimal interval with the same width given in
(23).
The same considerations hold for (21), but using the next interval
for δT :
δT ∈
(
τ − γ5①− γ6 − γ2S
µ3kj①+ λ
3
kj
,−
γ5①+ γ6 + γ2S
µ3kj①+ λ
3
kj
)
. 
It is worth noting that the width of the infinitely small interval does
not depend on the effective and subsequent choice of the other payoffs’,
i.e., it does not depend on the values assigned to either δT , δR, δP (when
γ1 6= 0, as it can be seen from (18)) or S, δR, δP (when γ1 = 0, as it can
be seen from (23)).
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